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Introduction 
When Californian voters passed the first modern medical mari-
juana ballot measure in 1996, it was hard to imagine federal law 
might ever change to accommodate it. At the time, then–drug czar 
Barry McCaffrey called the law “a cruel hoax that sounds more like 
something out of a Cheech and Chong show.”1 The Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) threatened to go after the controlled sub-
stances licenses of doctors who recommended medical marijuana,2 and 
the House of Representatives passed a symbolic “Not Legalizing 
Marijuana for Medical Use” sense of Congress resolution by a vote of 
310 to 93.3   
† Associate Professor and Director, Center for Law and Social Justice, 
Thomas Jefferson School of Law. 
1. Peter Hecht, Weedland: Inside America’s Marijuana Epicenter 
and How Pot Went Legit 67 (2014). 
2. Administration Response to Arizona Proposition 200 and California 
Proposition 215, 62 Fed. Reg. 6164 (Feb. 11, 1997) (“[T]he DEA will 
seek to revoke the DEA registrations of physicians who recommend or 
prescribe Schedule I controlled substances.”). The Ninth Circuit 
enjoined the plan on First Amendment grounds. Conant v. Walters, 309 
F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002).  
3. See Caroline Herman, United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ 
Cooperative: Whatever Happened to Federalism?, 93 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 121, 123–24 n.19 (2002) (discussing the “sense of  
Congress” vote). 
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Even as more and more states followed California’s lead and 
passed medical marijuana laws of their own, little changed at the 
federal level. By one estimate, the federal government spent $483 
million dollars interfering with state medical marijuana laws between 
1996 and 2012, conducting at least 528 raids and dozens of prosecu-
tions of people operating in compliance with state medical marijuana 
laws.4  
By the time Colorado and Washington took state reforms even 
further in 2012 with laws legalizing marijuana for recreational use, 
federal marijuana laws and enforcement policies stood in roughly the 
same place as they had back in 1996. If anything, the Obama admini-
stration’s actions on medical marijuana—vigorously raiding and pros-
ecuting state operators despite a 2008 campaign pledge5 and a 2009 
Department of Justice memo6 that indicated he would do just the 
opposite—made the prospect of change at the federal level seem even 
bleaker.7 
Somewhat suddenly, however, the last two years have seen the 
once-impossible idea of reforming federal marijuana law become seem-
ingly inevitable.8 In late 2013, the Department of Justice announced a 
new round of marijuana enforcement guidelines.9 The text of the 
 
4. Peace for Patients, Americans for Safe Access, What’s the 
Cost? The Federal War on Patients 3, 16 (2013), available at 
http://american-safe-access.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/WhatsTheCost.
pdf. 
5. Tim Dickenson, Obama’s War on Pot, Rolling Stone (Mar. 1, 2012), 
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/obamas-war-on-pot-2010216 
(reporting that as a candidate President Obama said, “I’m not going to 
be using Justice Department resources to try to circumvent state laws 
on this issue”). 
6. Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen. for Selected 
United States Attorneys, Investigations and Prosecutions in States 
Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana (Oct. 19, 2009), available at 
http://blogs.justice.gov/main/archives/192. 
7. See, e.g., Dickenson, supra note 5 (“[O]ver the past year, the Obama 
administration has quietly unleashed a multiagency crackdown on med-
ical cannabis that goes far beyond anything undertaken by George W. 
Bush.”); Alex Kreit, Reflections on State Medical Marijuana 
Prosecutions and the Duty to Seek Justice, 89 Denv. U. L. Rev. 1027, 
1036–41 (2012) (discussing the aftermath of the 2009 Department of 
Justice memo on federal medical marijuana prosecutions). 
8. See Eliana Dockterman, Poll: Three in Four Say Legalized Pot Is 
Inevitable, Time (Apr. 2, 2014), http://time.com/47007/poll-three-in-four-
say-legalized-pot-is-inevitable/. 
9. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to all United 
States Attorneys, Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement (Aug. 29, 
2013) [hereinafter Cole Memo], available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf. 
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DOJ’s 2013 guidance is not all that different from its largely ignored 
2009 memorandum. This time, however, federal prosecutors and the 
DEA have mostly abided by the advice. As a result, stores are selling 
marijuana in Colorado and Washington as openly as they would any 
other consumer good. Perhaps even more notable, the 2015 federal 
budget included an appropriations rider banning the Department of 
Justice from spending money to block the implementation of state 
medical marijuana laws.10 Taken together, these two developments 
suggest the executive and legislative branches are finally coming 
around to the conclusion that enforcing federal marijuana prohibition 
in states that have enacted reform is simply no longer a viable option.  
But if uniformly enforced federal marijuana prohibition is no 
longer sustainable, what should a new policy look like? Perhaps be-
cause the prospect of a move away from federal marijuana prohibition 
has seemed so remote for so long, there has not been much serious 
dialogue about the pros and cons of the various alternatives. Mari-
juana legalization advocates have been focused on lobbying for any 
politically viable short-term workaround to the conflict between state 
and federal law, not crafting a policy for the long-term. Prohibition-
ists, meanwhile, have been sticking with a run-out-the-clock strategy, 
betting on the hope that the medical and recreational marijuana 
legalization trend will eventually reverse itself and working to keep 
federal marijuana laws untouched until that day comes. 
So much energy has been directed at the debate about whether to 
change federal marijuana laws that the question of how to change 
them has been almost an afterthought. Barring a dramatic political 
reversal, however, it is no longer a matter of whether but when, and 
that makes the how of federal marijuana reform increasingly 
important. Instead of trying to find the best short-term fix to the 
current state–federal conflict, it is time to start thinking seriously 
about what federal marijuana policy should look like for the next 
forty or fifty years. This Article aims to help further the dialogue on 
this question. My goal is not to advocate for any particular solution 
or consider any one option in detail, but instead to highlight some of 
the considerations that might guide the debate and some of the trade-
offs different sorts of policies might entail. I argue that the federal  
10. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 
113-235, § 538, 128 Stat. 2130 (2014) (“None of the funds made 
available in this Act to the Department of Justice may be used, with 
respect to the States of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, 
Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, 
Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin, to prevent such States from 
implementing their own State laws that authorize the use, distribution, 
possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana.”). 
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marijuana reform ideas that have generated the most political interest 
and momentum so far (appropriations provisos and affirmative de-
fense proposals) suffer from serious flaws that make them unlikely to 
be attractive long-term options. Instead, more sweeping changes to 
federal law are likely necessary to harmonize state and federal 
marijuana law. And, though perhaps counterintuitive, there are 
reasons legalization opponents may also come to reluctantly accept 
ideas like federal marijuana regulation or state waiver programs as the 
best option for addressing some of their biggest concerns as legaliz-
ation moves forward. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I briefly lays out the 
case for why federal law must change to accommodate state mari-
juana reforms and why, although perhaps not politically viable today, 
change is nevertheless inevitable and may come much sooner than 
many think. Part II considers the types of federal marijuana reform 
proposals that have generated interest and analyzes which is most 
likely to effectively end the conflict between state and federal 
marijuana law. Part III looks at the idea of federal marijuana law 
from the perspective of marijuana legalization opponents and skeptics. 
Though people in this category might prefer nationwide marijuana 
prohibition, if that is not a viable option in the long-term, what fed-
eral policy would be most likely to effectively address their central 
concerns about legalization? 
I. Why Federal Marijuana Law Reform Is 
Both Necessary and Inevitable 
Walking around Denver, Colorado, or leafing through the Wall 
Street Journal, it would be easy to forget that federal law still crimi-
nalizes the distribution,11 manufacture,12 and even simple possession of 
marijuana.13 State-legal marijuana stores openly sell millions of 
dollars’ worth of marijuana in Colorado,14 seemingly unconcerned by 
the lengthy federal sentences their operators are risking.15 Meanwhile, 
angel investors pump money into marijuana ventures like Eaze, a  
11. The Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012). 
12. Id.  
13. Id. § 844(a) (“It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or 
intentionally to possess a controlled substance.”).  
14. Christopher Ingraham, Colorado Marijuana Revenues Hit a New High, 
Wash. Post Wonkblog (Oct. 14, 2014), http://www.washington 
post.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/10/14/colorado-marijuana-revenues-
hit-a-new-high/ (reporting that approximately $34.1 million worth of 
recreational marijuana was sold in Colorado in August 2014). 
15. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vii) (providing for a mandatory 
minimum sentence of ten years for the distribution of 1,000 or more 
marijuana plants or 1,000 kilograms or more of marijuana). 
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“high-tech pot-delivery service”16—or, in the eyes of federal drug laws, 
a sophisticated conspiracy to illegally distribute a controlled  
substance.  
The disconnect between the letter of federal law and the emerging 
marijuana industry is, in large part, the result of an August 2013 
Department of Justice (DOJ) memo advising federal prosecutors not 
to interfere with state marijuana legalization laws.17 The memo cau-
tions that it “is intended solely as a guide to the exercise of investi-
gative and prosecutorial discretion” and does not give state-compliant 
marijuana operators any legally enforceable rights or protection.18 But 
enough marijuana operators have put their confidence in the DOJ’s 
nonbinding guidance that it has proven to be a relatively effective 
short-term answer to the state-federal marijuana conflict, at least so 
far. With marijuana businesses operating openly, it is fair to ask 
whether the state–federal marijuana conflict has already been solved. 
Does Congress really need to change federal law, or can federal 
prohibition and state legalization comfortably coexist through an 
executive nonenforcement policy?  
Though the DOJ’s marijuana nonenforcement policy could 
continue indefinitely in theory, it is not a long-term solution for 
several reasons. First, prosecutorial guidance is just that—guidance. A 
new Attorney General could decide to change the policy.19 If that 
happens, the people investing in marijuana delivery startups today 
could be facing federal drug charges tomorrow. Because their actions 
violate existing federal law, there would be no ex post facto bar to 
prosecuting marijuana business operators for conduct they undertook 
while the nonenforcement prosecutorial guidance was in effect. As a 
result, every Colorado marijuana business owner who employs an 
 
16. Timothy Hay, “Uber for Pot” Eaze Raises $1.5 Million to Deliver 
Medical Marijuana, Wall St. J. (Nov. 5, 2014, 8:00 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/2014/11/05/uber-for-pot-eaze-raises-
1-5-million-to-deliver-medical-marijuana/. 
17. Cole Memo, supra note 9. 
18. Id. at 4. 
19. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and 
Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA L. Rev. 74, 90 (2015) (observing 
that making a federal nonenforcement policy permanent “cannot be 
done by executive action alone because enforcement decisions made by 
one presidential administration could easily be overturned by the next”); 
Vikas Bajaj, Op-Ed., Will the Next Attorney General Crack Down on 
Marijuana?, N.Y. Times Take Note Blog (Jan. 29, 2015), http:// 
mobile.nytimes.com/blogs/takingnote/2015/01/29/will-the-next-attor 
ney-general-crack-down-on-marijuana/ (reporting on the confirmation 
for Loretta Lynch, President Obama’s nominee to replace Eric Holder as 
Attorney General, and observing that “Lynch’s statements serve as a 
reminder that the Obama administration’s policy on marijuana could 
easily be reversed”). 
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armed security guard could wind up serving an effective life sentence 
in federal prison20 when a new President is sworn into office in 
January 2017, even if they closed their doors in November 2016. 
Indeed, even while the policy is in place, a disobedient federal prose-
cutor could simply ignore it.21 Because the policy is only advisory, it 
does not give state-legal marijuana operators who rely on it a defense 
in federal court.22 
Second, even if the DOJ’s nonenforcement policy could reliably 
shield marijuana businesses from federal criminal prosecution, it does 
not solve the conflict between federal prohibition and state legaliz-
ation entirely. As Erwin Chemerinsky, Jolene Foran, Allen Hopper, 
and Sam Kamin explain in their recent article Cooperative Federalism 
and Marijuana Regulation, there are a number of “substantial 
obstacles to businesses and adults seeking to implement and avail 
themselves of new state laws authorizing marijuana distribution and 
use” that cannot be solved by prosecutorial discretion alone.23 These 
obstacles include access to banks, which are far less likely to be 
persuaded by advisory guidance24; access to attorneys, who may face 
ethics charges for facilitating federally illegal drug operations25; a 
“crippling” federal tax penalty for marijuana businesses26; and risks to 
 
20. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012) provides for stiff mandatory minimum senten-
ces for the use of a gun in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. See, 
e.g., United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1230 (D. Utah 
2004) (imposing a fifty-five-year mandatory minimum sentence under 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c) for a defendant who carried a handgun to two 
marijuana sales and possessed guns in his home), aff’d 433 F.3d 738 
(10th Cir. 2006). 
21. See, e.g., Robert A. Mikos, A Critical Appraisal of the Department of 
Justice’s New Approach to Medical Marijuana, 22 Stan. L. & Pol’y 
Rev. 633, 643–45 (2011) (explaining that “the DOJ is [a] fragmented 
agency, one in which several autonomous decision makers help share 
enforcement policy” and that not all U.S. Attorneys support the guid-
ance issued by the DOJ in Washington).  
22. See, e.g., United Sates v. Stacy, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1145 (S.D. Cal. 
2010). 
23. Chemerinsky et al., supra note 19, at 90–91. 
24. Julie Andersen Hill, Banks, Marijuana, and Federalism, 65 Case W. 
Res. L. Rev. 597 (2015) (arguing that banking will continue to present 
“urgent” problems to the marijuana industry because banks do not want 
to risk noncompliance with federal law). 
25. Sam Kamin & Eli Wald, Marijuana Lawyers: Outlaws or Crusaders?, 91 
Or. L. Rev. 869 (2013) (discussing how attorneys who represent 
state-legal marijuana businesses might risk running afoul of ethics laws 
because all lawyers have a duty to not “knowingly assist criminal 
conduct”). 
26. Chemerinsky et al., supra note 19, at 94; see also, e.g., Benjamin Moses 
Leff, Tax Planning for Marijuana Dealers, 99 Iowa L. Rev. 523 (2014) 
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users in the form of potential adverse employment, probation and 
parole, and family law consequences.27 Federal prohibition also leaves 
marijuana businesses with a great deal of uncertainty when it comes 
to intellectual property rights,28 the availability of insurance, and even 
the enforceability of standard business contracts.29 While it is possible 
some of these hurdles can be overcome in whole or in part without 
legislative action, others are almost certain to remain.  
Third, the continuing nonenforcement of federal drug laws would 
raise serious concerns about the limits of executive power. In his 
recent article Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, Zachary 
Price considers the federal government’s response to state marijuana 
legalization laws.30 Price argues that while “[s]ome degree of top-down 
direction regarding” Justice Department resources may be 
appropriate, “a more definite nonenforcement policy . . . would exceed 
the Executive’s proper role by effectively suspending a federal statute 
and thus usurping Congress’s constitutional responsibility to set 
national policy.”31 The longer the federal government goes without 
prosecuting or otherwise interfering with32 marijuana businesses, the 
more definite its nonenforcement policy effectively becomes. To be 
sure, as a matter of legal doctrine on executive discretion, it is quite 
likely that the DOJ’s marijuana nonenforcement policy could continue  
(discussing Internal Revenue Code § 280E, which requires sellers of 
federally illegal drugs to pay taxes on their gross revenue instead of 
their net income). 
27. See generally Chemerinsky et al., supra note 19, at 90–100 (surveying 
impediments faced by states seeking to regulate marijuana “due to 
marijuana’s continuing illegality under federal law”). 
28. Robert A. Mikos, State Taxation of Marijuana Distribution and Other 
Federal Crimes, 2010 U. Chi. Legal F. 223, 257 (2010) (“The federal 
Lanham Act bars the registration of a trademark used on any product 
proscribed by federal law, including marijuana.”); Kieran G. Doyle, 
Trademark Strategies for Emerging Marijuana Businesses, 21 Westlaw 
J. Intell. Prop. 1 (2014) (explaining that “the pathway toward 
legitimate in the eyes of the [United States Patent and Trademark 
Office] may be a rocky one” for marijuana businesses). 
29. Chemerinsky et al., supra note 19, at 96–97 (discussing cases in which 
courts have declined to enforce insurance policies and other contracts for 
marijuana businesses and concluding that marijuana businesses “cannot 
rely on the contracts they sign or the insurance they pay for”). 
30. Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 
Vand. L. Rev. 671, 758–59 (2014). 
31. Id.  
32. Federal law enforcement officials have employed a range of tactics to try 
to shut down people operating pursuant to state marijuana laws, 
including asset forfeiture and civil suits. See, e.g., United States v. 
Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001) (involving a civil 
suit to enjoin the operation of medical marijuana cooperatives).  
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indefinitely.33 And even as a matter of policy, the dividing line 
between acceptable guidance about how to use limited law 
enforcement resources and a problematic de facto suspension of 
federal law by the Executive is open to debate. But, at the very least, 
a sustained nonenforcement policy presents difficult questions about 
executive power and the rule of law.  
Fourth, applying federal marijuana laws in some states but not 
others might also be objectionable on the grounds that it is incon-
sistent with the principle of equal application of the law. Federal drug 
laws are meant to apply uniformly across the country, at least as they 
are currently written. Under the DOJ’s nonenforcement policy, how-
ever, a person openly selling marijuana in Wyoming continues to risk 
a lengthy stay in federal prison while a person engaging in the same 
conduct in Colorado can make millions. This state of affairs has 
already led at least one federal judge to deviate from the penalties 
recommended by the federal sentencing guidelines for marijuana. The 
judge reasoned that “changes in state law and federal enforcement 
policy regarding marijuana”34 warranted a reduced sentence, at least 
for a distribution scheme that “bears some similarity to those 
marijuana distribution operations in Colorado and Washington that 
will not be subject to federal prosecution.”35  
For these reasons, although the DOJ’s nonenforcement policy may 
work as a temporary fix, legislators should not view it as a long-term 
solution. Of course, it is also possible for the executive to change 
marijuana’s status under federal law even without congressional 
action by administratively reclassifying marijuana under the Con-
trolled Substances Act (CSA). Under the CSA, drugs are divided into 
five “schedules” based on their potential for abuse, medicinal value, 
 
33. As a recent Congressional Research Service report explained, “courts 
have been reluctant to withdraw the executive’s discretion to decide 
whether to initiate a prosecution” in the absence of “clear and 
unambiguous evidence of Congress’s intent to withdraw traditional 
prosecutorial discretion.” Todd Garvey, Cong. Research Serv., 
R43708, The Take Care Clause and Executive Discretion in 
the Enforcement of Law 14 (2014). The Controlled Substances Act 
does not contain the sort of express congressional directive that would 
be likely to constrain prosecutorial discretion under current doctrine. 
Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2012). 
34. United States v. Dayi, 980 F. Supp. 2d 682, 683 (D. Md. 2013). 
35. Id. at 689. Cf. United States v. Irlmeier, 750 F.3d 759, 766–67 (8th Cir. 
2014) (Bright, J., dissenting) (“In today’s world where several states in 
this country have legalized marijuana use for medical purposes and two 
states have even legalized its recreational use, a hard look should apply 
to marijuana prosecutions carrying mandatory minimum sentences as in 
this case.”).  
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and addictiveness.36 The DEA has the power to add a new substance 
to the schedules, move a substance between schedules, or remove a 
currently scheduled substance entirely.37 Ever since the CSA was 
passed in 1970, marijuana advocates have argued that the drug is 
improperly categorized in Schedule I, the strictest category, reserved 
for drugs with a high abuse potential and no currently accepted 
medical use.38 In 2011, the governors of Rhode Island and Washington 
called for rescheduling and even suggested that the move could har-
monize state and federal marijuana laws.39  
Whatever the merits of rescheduling, it would not fix the state–
federal conflict over marijuana. As an initial matter, so long as 
marijuana is scheduled, it would be illegal to sell the drug for 
recreational use—even Schedule V substances can only be sold for 
medicinal use.40 Though the CSA does permit the de-scheduling of 
drugs, marijuana is exceedingly unlikely to ever qualify for complete 
removal under the scheduling criteria.41 Even if it could, the CSA 
requires scheduling decisions to meet U.S. treaty obligations, regard-
less of the criteria.42 As a result, the DEA could not remove marijuana 
from the CSA without a change in the international drug treaties and, 
very likely, could not move it any lower than Schedule II.43 Resche-
duling marijuana might help begin to address the conflict between 
 
36. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b) (2012). For an overview of the Controlled Substances 
Act’s classification scheme, see, e.g., Gerald F. Uelmen & Alex 
Kreit, Drug Abuse and the Law Sourcebook §§ 1:1-1:16 (2014–
2015 ed.), available at Westlaw. 
37. The CSA grants rescheduling power to the Attorney General, but the 
Attorney General has delegated this authority to the head of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration. See Alex Kreit, Controlled Substances, 
Uncontrolled Law, 6 Alb. Gov’t L. Rev. 332, 336 (2013). 
38. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1) (providing the criteria for placing a substance in 
Schedule I). 
39. See e.g., Jonathan Martin, Gregoire to DEA: Make Marijuana a Legal 
Drug, Seattle Times, Dec. 1, 2011, http:/twww.seattletimes.com/ 
seattle-nevvs/gregoire-to-dea-make-marijuana-a-legal-drug/. 
40. 21 U.S.C. § 829(c) (2012) (“No controlled substance in schedule V which 
is a drug may be distributed or dispensed other than for medical 
purposes.”). 
41. For this reason, alcohol and tobacco are both statutorily exempt from 
regulation under the Controlled Substances Act. 21 U.S.C. § 802(6) 
(2012). 
42. Id. § 812(b). 
43. Nat’l Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Drug Enforcement 
Admin., 559 F.2d 735, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (reporting that the DEA 
concluded United States treaty commitments would permit marijuana to 
be moved to Schedule II but not lower). See also Uelmen & Kreit, supra 
note 36, at § 1:15. 
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federal and state medical marijuana laws. But even for state medical 
marijuana laws, federal rescheduling would raise as many questions as 
answers. This is because state medical marijuana regimes are far more 
expansive than federal oversight for Schedule II and III drugs. Indeed, 
because marijuana does not have FDA approval, it is unclear that 
marijuana could actually be marketed as a medicine at all even if it 
were rescheduled.44  
Of course, not everyone would like to see the federal government 
accommodate state marijuana reforms. Those who favor marijuana 
prohibition might be inclined to leave the federal prohibition of mari-
juana in place (though polling indicates substantial support for defer-
ring to states, even among legalization opponents).45 If federal mari-
juana prohibition had been successful at blocking state medical and 
recreational marijuana laws, federal marijuana prohibition might be a 
viable long-term option. The trouble for would-be supporters of the 
status quo is that federal marijuana prohibition has proven itself in-
capable of stopping state legalization laws.46  
Between 1996 and 2008, the federal government unambiguously 
opposed state medical marijuana laws and fought hard to block their 
implementation.47 Even as recently as late 2012, a state-legal Montana 
medical marijuana provider was convicted of federal charges carrying 
eight decades of mandatory federal prison time.48 Despite their best 
efforts, however, federal drug enforcement officials were not able to 
stop states from passing and implementing medical marijuana laws. 
 
44. See Kevin A. Sabet, Much Ado About Nothing: Why Rescheduling 
Won’t Solve Advocates’ Medical Marijuana Problem, 58 Wayne L. 
Rev. 81, 82–83 (2012). 
45. Jacob Sullum, Poll Finds Most Americans Support Treating Marijuana 
Like Alcohol; Even More Think the Feds Should Let States Do So, 
Reason (Jan. 31, 2013, 12:41 PM), http://reason.com/blog/2013/01/31 
/poll-finds-most-americans-support-treati (reporting on poll results in 
which only about half of respondents supported marijuana legalization 
but 68% said the federal government should not arrest marijuana 
growers who are in compliance with state law). 
46. See, e.g., Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical 
Marijuana and the States’ Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 
62 Vand. L. Rev. 1421 (2009). 
47. Alex Kreit, Beyond the Prohibition Debate: Thoughts on Federal Drug 
Laws in an Age of State Reforms, 13 Chap. L. Rev. 555, 566–70 (2010) 
(providing an overview of federal enforcement efforts against medical 
marijuana providers from 1996 and 2008). 
48. The defendant, Chris Williams, ultimately received a five-year sentence 
after prosecutors took the extraordinary step of reducing the charges 
after trial. Gwen Florio, Montana Medical Marijuana Grower Gets 5 
Years in Federal Prison, Missoulian, Feb. 1, 2013, http://missoulian. 
com/news/local/montana-medical-marijuana-grower-gets-years-in-federal 
-prison/article_89211f90-6ca5-11e2-aa17-001a4bcf887a.html. 
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To be sure, vigorously enforced federal marijuana prohibition made 
life more difficult for state-legal marijuana operators, with an unlucky 
few now serving federal prison sentences. But because the federal 
government depends almost entirely on state law enforcement re-
sources to enforce drug prohibition laws, it did not have the resources 
to deter medical marijuana businesses from openly operating.49 As a 
result, federal marijuana prohibition enforcement efforts served mostly 
to make state medical marijuana laws less well controlled than they 
otherwise might have been.50 Though the Supremacy Clause might 
give a glimmer of hope to federal marijuana prohibition, so far courts 
have largely rejected the argument that federal law preempts state 
marijuana laws.51 Unless that changes, whatever one thinks about the 
merits of state legalization, federal law is powerless to stop it. Nearly 
two decades of experience point to the almost inescapable conclusion 
that so long as states continue to pass marijuana legalization laws, 
nationwide federal prohibition is not a realistic policy option. Perhaps 
more than anything else, this fact is what makes federal marijuana 
reform inevitable.  
II. Proposals to Solve the Conflict Between 
State and Federal Marijuana Laws 
Though it is becoming clearer that today’s federal marijuana laws 
are not sustainable—at least not without a dramatic reversal of course 
at the state level—the dialogue about how to reform them should be 
done is still in its infancy. To date, most proposals to change federal 
marijuana law have come from state marijuana legalization supporters 
and have focused mostly on minimizing or resolving the current state–
federal conflict. They fall into roughly four categories: (1) preventing 
the Department of Justice from spending money to interfere with 
state marijuana laws; (2) providing an affirmative defense based on 
compliance with state marijuana laws; (3) letting states opt out of 
 
49. Mikos, supra note 46, at 1463–67 (arguing that the federal government’s 
limited law enforcement resources mean that it cannot arrest and 
prosecute more than a small fraction of marijuana offenders). 
50. Kreit, supra note 47, at 569–75 (arguing that federal enforcement made 
it more difficult for states to effectively regulate and control medical 
marijuana). 
51. See, e.g., Beek v. City of Wyo., 495 Mich. 1 (2014) (finding that Mich-
igan’s medical marijuana was not preempted by federal law); Robert A. 
Mikos, Preemption Under the Controlled Substances Act, 16 J. Health 
Care L. & Pol’y 5, 37 (2013) (“[T]he CSA, properly understood, 
preempts only a handful of the [marijuana] laws now being promulgated 
throughout the states.”). 
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federal marijuana prohibition; and (4) ending the federal ban on mari-
juana and replacing it with some sort of federal regulatory structure.52  
To begin to make sense of the different alternatives for federal 
marijuana law reform, this section considers the benefits and pitfalls 
of each type of reform based on the goal of minimizing the conflict 
between state and federal marijuana laws. Though this is a pressing 
concern, it is hardly the only goal lawmakers might want to pursue in 
crafting marijuana policy. In the next section, I will consider how 
legalization opponents might view different options for reform and 
take up the question of what type of legal structure would give the 
federal government the most control in shaping and limiting state 
marijuana laws.  
A. Reform Through Appropriations Provisos 
The only successful federal marijuana reform proposal to date was 
focused on spending. In spring 2014, the House of Representatives 
narrowly passed an appropriations amendment to prevent the Depart-
ment of Justice from spending any money to block states from imple-
menting their medical marijuana laws. (The amendment does not ap-
ply to the legalization laws in Alaska, Colorado, Oregon, and Wash-
ington.) The Senate never voted on the provision directly, and, for 
much of 2014, it seemed unlikely ever to become law. Ultimately, 
however, it made its way into the final budget for 2015.53  
From a political perspective, the development was groundbreak-
ing. It marked the first congressional vote in support of easing federal 
marijuana law and suggested that Congress and the President are 
both now (very tentatively) inclined to permit state medical mari-
juana laws to go forward in some way. It also signaled just how 
quickly marijuana politics is changing: the last time the amendment 
came up for a vote, in 2007, it failed, garnering only 165 votes at a 
time when the Democrats had a majority in the House.54  
It is not hard to guess at why addressing the state–federal mari-
juana conflict through a spending proposal may be more politically 
appealing than other options. Although polls indicate supporting 
 
52. See, e.g., Chemerinsky et al., supra note 19, at 113–14 (summarizing 
marijuana reform bills that have been introduced in Congress).  
53. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 
113-235, § 538, 128 Stat. 2130 (2014). The appropriations act also limits 
the use of funds to block industrial hemp research programs. Id. § 539. 
54. Congress Votes to End War on Medical Marijuana Patients and 
Providers, Marijuana Policy Project, http://www.mpp.org/media/ 
press-releases/congress-votes-to-end-war-on.html (last visited Mar. 20, 
2015). 
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marijuana reform is good politics,55 many politicians still do not see it 
that way.56 And, for elected officials who came up in the drug war era 
of the 1980s or 1990s, an appropriations measure almost certainly 
carries the least risk of giving an opponent fodder for a “soft on 
crime” type of attack ad. A spending proviso is temporary. It does not 
change federal law, and it can be easily omitted from the next year’s 
budget. In addition, it can be framed as a question of allocating 
federal resources, not necessarily a position on the merits of state 
marijuana laws. Couching marijuana reform in spending terms may 
also be more likely to appeal to Republican legislators, particularly 
those closely aligned with the “tea party” brand. After all, cutting 
federal spending is at the core of the tea party’s political identity.57 
Last but not least, an appropriations amendment is much easier to 
get onto the floor of the House than, say, a bill to remove marijuana 
from the Controlled Substances Act, which would typically proceed 
through the usual committee process. 
Unfortunately, the politics is not particularly well aligned with 
policy in this instance. Of all the legislative options for addressing the 
conflict between state marijuana reforms and federal prohibition, 
spending restrictions are almost certain to be the least effective.  
As an initial matter, the spending restriction in the 2015 budget is 
not a model of clarity. The provision blocks the Department of Justice 
from using funds “to prevent . . . States from implementing their own 
State laws that authorize the use, distribution, possession, or cultiva-
tion of medical marijuana.”58 It is far from clear that this spending 
limitation applies to the investigation or prosecution of private parties 
at all. If the Department of Justice were to use funds to sue a state 
over its medical marijuana law or to prosecute a state official for 
issuing a medical marijuana permit, that would surely qualify as 
preventing the state from “implementing” its law.59 But does prose-
 
55. Lydia Saad, Majority Continues to Support Pot Legalization in U.S., 
Gallup (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/179195/majority-
continues-support-pot-legalization.aspx. 
56. See Nick Wing, Here Are All the U.S. Senators and Governors Who 
Support Legalizing Marijuana, The Huffington Post (Oct. 27, 2014, 
10:59 AM), http://m.huffpost.com/us/entry/5107508 (reporting that 
only one sitting United States Senator or Governor has “announced 
support for full legalization” of marijuana). 
57. Zachary A. Goldfarb, For Tea Party, Sequestration Is a Moment of 
Truth, Wash. Post, Feb. 26, 2013 at A4 (describing federal spending 
cuts as “the centerpiece” of the tea party’s economic message). 
58. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 
113-235, § 538, 128 Stat. 2130 (2014). 
59. To date, the DOJ has not prosecuted any state or local officials for 
issuing marijuana permits or sued to block a state’s marijuana law on a 
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cuting a dispensary operator in San Diego mean that California has 
been prevented from “implementing” its laws?60 The brief debate of 
the amendment on the House floor leaves little doubt that the pro-
vision’s backers meant to stop federal prosecutors from going after 
dispensary owners.61 And there is a strong argument that the text 
itself prevents the Department of Justice from prosecuting any state-
licensed patient or provider, whether or not the person is in compli-
ance with state law.62 After all, a medical marijuana dispensary oper-
ator whose state-law violation would result in a civil penalty or 
relatively minor criminal penalty could face years behind bars if 
prosecuted federally. The state has an interest in implementing its 
own laws by imposing its own penalties for noncompliance, not just in 
protecting compliant operators. Still, the scope of the provision is far 
from certain. Already, a handful of medical marijuana defendants 
have unsuccessfully argued the provision prevents the federal govern-
ment from going forward against them.63 Only time will tell how the  
preemption theory, so if this is all the provision restricts, it is not 
particularly far reaching. 
60. There is something of a parallel between this scenario and the federal 
preemption question. State marijuana reforms do not pose an obstacle to 
implementing federal prohibition because the federal government can 
continue to enforce its laws criminalizing marijuana—they just have to 
do it without the help of state and local officials. Similarly, one might 
argue that prosecuting a private party would never prevent the 
implementation of a state law. The state could still put its own law into 
effect by issuing permits, regulations, and so forth, even if private 
parties operating pursuant to the law risk federal prosecution. 
61. E.g., 160 Cong. Rec. H4984 (daily ed. May 29, 2014) (statement of 
Rep. Titus) (explaining that under the appropriations amendment, 
“[p]hysicians in [medical marijuana] States will not be prosecuted for 
prescribing the substance, and local businesses will not be shut down for 
dispensing the same”). 
62. See Alex Kreit, The 2015 Federal Budget’s Medical Marijuana Provi-
sion: An “End to the Federal Ban on Marijuana” or Something Less 
Than That?, 35 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2015). 
63. See, e.g., Jacob Sullum, Jurors Can’t Know Pot Growers Are Patients, 
Reason (Feb. 2, 2015), http://reason.com/archives/2015/02/02/jurors-
cant-know-pot-growers-are-patient (reporting on motions based on the 
appropriations restriction that were filed in a Washington state federal 
medical marijuana case); Douglas A. Berman, Defense Moves to 
Postpone Federal Marijuana Sentencing Based on New Law Ordering 
DOJ Not to Prevent States From Implementing Medical Marijuana 
Laws, Sent. L. & Pol’y Blog (Dec. 16, 2014, 6:13 PM), http:// 
sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2014/12/defense-
moves-to-postpone-federal-marijuana-sentencing-based-new-law-ordering-
doj-not-to-prevent-33-.html (reporting on a federal marijuana prosecu-
tion in California where the defendant argues the federal appropriations 
restriction prevents the Department of Justice from continuing with the 
case). 
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courts interpret and apply the provision and, perhaps more 
importantly, whether it is renewed in next year’s budget. 
Of course, a drafting problem with the 2015 spending amendment 
does not necessarily mean the idea of updating federal marijuana law 
through a spending amendment is flawed. But even the most carefully 
written appropriations amendment would not be a particularly effect-
ive solution to the state–federal disconnect.  
First, preventing the Department of Justice from spending money 
to prosecute state-legal marijuana operators would not provide any 
sort of lasting immunity from prosecution. Congress could decide to 
lift the spending restriction next year or the year after that. Indeed, 
in the absence of “futurity” language, an appropriation proviso applies 
only to the covered fiscal year and must be passed by Congress 
annually to remain in effect.64 If and when the appropriations restrict-
ion were ever lifted, the Department of Justice could presumably 
prosecute marijuana distributors for acts they committed during the 
restricted period. Though defense attorneys might litigate the issue, it 
is hard to imagine courts finding an ex post facto bar to prosecuting 
people for conduct they engaged in while an appropriation limit was 
in place. If Congress had intended to make it legal for state-regulated 
actors to distribute marijuana, it could have amended or repealed the 
Controlled Substances Act.65 A spending restriction, by contrast, 
speaks only to Congress’s budget priorities. Congress might decide to 
temporarily stop the Department of Justice from spending money to 
investigate a class of cases when money is tight with the hope that 
prosecutions will resume as soon as resources permit. For this reason, 
a spending ban does not provide any more long-term protection than 
the Department of Justice’s own advisory marijuana enforcement 
memo.  
Second, blocking federal law enforcement officials from spending 
money to pursue state-compliant marijuana cases presents a difficult 
logistical puzzle. At what point in a particular case does the spending 
restriction kick in? If the DEA believed a state marijuana licensee was 
using her permit as a cover for other illegal activity, confirming or 
disconfirming that suspicion would require it to spend money on an 
investigation. As a result, it is hard to imagine Congress would stop 
the Department of Justice from spending money at the investigation 
 
64. See Auburn Hous. Auth. v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 138, 146 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(discussing the “presumption that a provision contained in an approp-
riation act applies only in the applicable fiscal year”). 
65. It is unlikely that the inclusion of “futurity” language would change the 
equation on this point. See Atl. Fish Spotters Ass’n v. Evans, 321 F.3d 
220, 225 (1st Cir. 2003) (“We caution, however, that even the presence 
of [futurity] words will not establish permanence if that construction 
would render other statutory language meaningless or lead to an absurd 
result.”).  
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stage. Even a spending limit that tried to address this issue by, say, 
allowing for investigations where there was reasonable suspicion that 
the target was out of compliance with state marijuana laws would tie 
the Justice Department’s hands in many cases.66  
On the other hand, an appropriations restriction that allowed the 
DEA to investigate marijuana providers in reform states would raise a 
tricky problem of its own: how would a federal prosecutor’s claim that 
someone was operating on the wrong side of state law be resolved? 
The most plausible answer—at a federal criminal trial—would have to 
overcome the fact that compliance with state marijuana laws is not a 
defense under the CSA. Ever since the DOJ released its enforcement 
memo in 2009, federal medical marijuana defendants have argued they 
should be allowed to introduce evidence of compliance with state law 
as a defense. But federal courts have uniformly excluded the defense.67 
As a result, there has been no avenue to test DOJ claims of noncom-
pliance with state law, even in cases where the evidence of compliance 
seems to be pretty strong.68 The addition of a spending provision 
would certainly strengthen the argument that the issue of a federal 
defendant’s state-law compliance should go to the jury. But without 
an affirmative defense in the CSA itself, this would still be an awk-
ward solution at best. Ultimately, a federal spending restriction would 
seem to require choosing between a number of unsatisfactory options: 
engrafting a limited “state compliance” defense onto the federal law, 
blocking all prosecutions where a defendant merely claimed state com-
pliance, or taking the federal government’s word and leaving federal 
 
66. If the DEA received an anonymous tip that a state marijuana licensee 
was selling to children or a front for distributing other drugs, for 
example, it would not have reasonable suspicion and could not spend 
any money to follow up on the tip. See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 
274 (2000) (finding that an anonymous tip standing alone did not give 
rise to reasonable suspicion). The risk that a pretrial spending restrict-
ion would deter legitimate investigations is heightened by the Anti-
Deficiency Act, which can result in criminal liability for an official who 
makes an expenditure that has not been authorized by Congress. 
31 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012). See also J. Gregory Sidak, The President’s 
Power of the Purse, 1989 Duke L.J. 1162, 1234 (1989) (discussing the 
Anti-Deficiency Act, “which prohibits any officer or employee of the 
United States from making expenditures or incurring obligations either 
in excess of available appropriations or in advance of appropriations, 
unless he has legal authorization for making them”). 
67. See, e.g., United Sates v. Stacy, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1145 (S.D. Cal. 
2010). 
68. For example, federal medical marijuana defendant Charlie Lynch was 
unable to raise compliance with state law as a defense. At sentencing, 
however, the judge “talked at length about what he said were Mr. 
Lynch’s many efforts to follow California’s laws on marijuana 
dispensaries.” Solomon Moore, Prison Term for a Seller of Medical 
Marijuana, N.Y. Times, June 12, 2009, at A18. 
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marijuana defendants who claimed to be complying with state law 
defenseless.  
To be sure, Congress could go further and stop the Department of 
Justice from spending any money on marijuana cases in states with 
medical marijuana laws. Short of that, however, it might not be 
possible to completely get around the chicken-and-the-egg problem of 
preventing federal agents and prosecutors from spending money on 
some, but not all, medical marijuana investigations.  
B. An Affirmative Defense Based on Compliance with State Law 
A second group of federal reform proposals would carve out ex-
emptions for state-legal marijuana activity from federal prosecution. 
The Truth in Trials Act, for example, would create “an affirmative 
defense to a prosecution or proceeding under any federal law for 
marijuana-related activities” for a defendant who could establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that his “activities comply with State 
law regarding the medical use of marijuana.”69 Other variants do not 
use affirmative defense language, instead stating that federal mari-
juana laws simply do not apply to state-compliant activity, poten-
tially requiring the government to prove noncompliance with state 
law in its case-in-chief. The Respect State Marijuana Laws Act pro-
vides that federal marijuana laws “shall not apply to any person 
acting in compliance with State laws relating to the production, 
possession, distribution, dispensation, administration, or delivery of 
marijuana.”70 A provision of the States’ Medical Marijuana Patient 
Protection Act would shield those “authorized by a State or local 
government, in a State in which the possession and use of marijuana 
for medical purposes is legal from producing, processing or distri-
buting marijuana for such purposes.”71  
Unlike an appropriations restriction, these proposals would give 
marijuana users and providers more than just temporary protection. 
By amending federal drug laws, these bills would unquestionably 
apply to any conduct that takes place while they are in place, even if 
they were later repealed. They would also avoid the cart-before-the-
horse problem that comes with spending provisos since there would be 
a legislatively established process for determining state compliance.  
By making federal immunity contingent on compliance with state 
law, however, these proposals present their own set of challenges. 
First, they would inevitably spawn difficult litigation over what con-
 
69. H.R. 710, 113th Cong. (1st. Sess. 2013).  
70. H.R. 1523, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013).  
71. H.R. 689, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013) (exempting from the Controlled 
Substances Act people who were “obtaining, manufacturing, possessing, 
or transporting within their State marijuana for medical purposes, pro-
vided the activities are authorized under State law”). 
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stitutes “compliance” with state law (or engaging in activities 
“authorized” by state law). In the case of users, this may be easy 
enough to answer. But, in most medical marijuana states, marijuana 
manufacturers and sellers are subject to a laundry list of state and 
local regulations.72 A seller who failed to abide by packaging require-
ments or who sold marijuana to an underage customer on a single 
occasion would be out of compliance with state law, at least with 
respect to the affected sales. Would errors like this leave the seller 
open to federal prosecution, or would substantial compliance with 
state law suffice? Would noncompliance infect the legitimacy of a 
defendant’s entire operation or would the defense apply on a per-
transaction basis? 
Second, wherever the compliance line was drawn, the federal 
prosecution of noncompliant state licensees would often be at cross-
purposes with state regulations. The risk of severe federal criminal 
penalties (enacted to enforce marijuana prohibition) would, inevit-
ably, undermine the state’s penalty system (enacted to regulate a 
legal marketplace).73 Marijuana operators would have to account for 
the fact that a misstep could result in a lengthy federal drug sentence. 
This would interfere with state regulatory efforts by keeping prices 
artificially high and, more important, making state-level enforcement 
more difficult. A marijuana business owner who might otherwise be 
inclined to self-report a regulatory violation if the penalty were a 
small fine would have a strong incentive to do everything in her 
power to hide it if there were a chance the penalty would be a federal 
prison sentence. 
C. Letting States Opt Out of Federal Marijuana Laws 
The third category of proposals would let states that met certain 
requirements opt out of federal marijuana prohibition laws through a 
waiver system. Opt-out proposals have not yet gained momentum in 
Congress, but a handful of prominent commentators have recently 
offered the idea as a politically viable middle ground between com-
plete federal legalization and more limited measures like appropria-
tions limits.74 Mark Kleiman and, separately, Erwin Chemerinsky,  
72. See, e.g., 1 Colo. Code Regs. § 212-2 (2014).  
73. See, e.g., Paul J. Larkin Jr., Regulation, Prohibition, and 
Overcriminalization: The Proper and Improper Uses of the Criminal 
Law, 42 Hofstra L. Rev. 745, 746 (2014) (arguing against the use 
of criminal law to enforce a regulatory regime because “[t]he function 
of the criminal law . . . is to enforce [a] moral code” while “the 
function of the regulatory system is to efficiently manage components 
of the . . . economy”). 
74. See, e.g., Chemerinsky et al., supra note 19, at 114 (proposing a waiver 
program as “a more incremental” step “[s]ince Congress does not yet 
appear inclined to completely end or even to significantly curtail the 
federal prohibition of marijuana”); see also, e.g., Stuart Taylor Jr., 
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Jolene Faran, Allen Hopper, and Sam Kamin, have proposed varia-
tions on the idea of letting states opt out of a federal marijuana law. 
Chemerinsky’s group recommends that the federal government adopt 
“either a permissive or cooperative federalism approach” that would 
allow “states meeting specified federal criteria to opt out of the CSA 
provisions relating to marijuana.”75 The permissive federalism version 
would entail granting states “temporary, revocable waivers” from 
federal marijuana laws.76 A cooperative federalism scheme would go 
beyond revocable waivers by letting “state law govern[] marijuana 
enforcement within opt-out states so long as the states comply with 
federal guidelines.”77 Kleiman, who was a consultant to Washington 
State on implementing its legalization law,78 suggests that existing 
federal law might already allow the Attorney General to enter into 
contracts that would require “the state and its localities to vigor-
ous[ly] enforce[] against [marijuana] exports in return for federal ac-
quiescence in intra-state sales regulated and taxed under state law.”79 
He argues, however, that amending federal law to permit state “can-
nabis policy waivers would be far cleaner conceptually” than contract-
ual agreements that “would leave the activity in state-regulated 
markets illegal under federal laws, albeit with some assurance that 
those laws would not be enforced.”80 
 
Marijuana Policy and Presidential Leadership: How to Avoid a Federal-
State Train Wreck, Governance Studies at Brookings (Apr. 2013) 
(proposing a waiver policy). 
75. Chemerinsky et al., supra note 19, at 114. 
76. Id. at 115. 
77. Id. at 116.  
78. Patrick Radden Keefe, Buzzkill, New Yorker (Nov. 18, 2013), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/11/18/buzzkill (reporting 
on Kleiman’s work advising Washington’s implementation of marijuana 
legalization laws). 
79. Mark A.R. Kleiman, Cooperative Enforcement Agreements and Policy 
Waivers: New Options for Federal Accommodation to State-Level 
Cannabis Legalization, 6 Drug Pol’y Analysis 1, 4 (2013). See also 21 
U.S.C. § 873 (2012) (providing for cooperative enforcement agreements). 
Though a cooperative enforcement agreement could be drafted to oper-
ate to let states opt out of federal enforcement, it could also take a more 
limited form. For example, the Attorney General could implement a 
more formalized version of the DOJ’s current prosecutorial guidance for 
marijuana. See Taylor, supra note 74, at 16–17 (proposing a contractual 
agreement the would require federal prosecutors “take no enforcement 
action against any state-licensed marijuana supplier unless the Attorney 
General (or a high-level designee) personally finds, in writing, that the 
supplier has violated state as well as federal law and that state and local 
authorities are unable or unwilling to correct the problem”). 
80. Kleiman, supra note 79, at 7.  
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Crafting a waiver policy would entail a number of “administrative 
complexities”81 about the sort of requirements states would have to 
meet to qualify and what the federal government could do to ensure 
compliance. Consider the Chemerinsky group’s proposal, for example. 
It would give states the opportunity to opt out of federal marijuana 
law by receiving certification from the Attorney General. Certification 
would be contingent on where state regulations and enforcement are 
“reasonably able to prevent” a number of problems, including the 
distribution of marijuana to minors, the diversion of marijuana to 
prohibition states, and violence in the market for marijuana.82 With-
out well-defined measurable targets, however, it would be difficult to 
effectively cabin the Attorney General’s discretion when determining 
whether a state has met its obligations. Open-ended goals like limiting 
the amount of marijuana that finds its way to other states are suscep-
tible to wildly different interpretations.83 But broad goals might be 
the only available option since it might not be possible to precisely 
measure—let alone set targets for—things like the leakage of mari-
juana from one state to the next or the number of sales to minors.  
Dealing with noncompliant states would raise an additional 
challenge for any waiver policy because the federal government’s only 
obvious remedy for addressing noncompliance would be far from satis-
fying. Revoking a waiver from federal marijuana prohibition would 
simply move things back to square one—a state legalization law that 
is impossible to reconcile with federal prohibition. This distinguishes 
marijuana from the other regulatory regimes the Chemerinsky group 
points to as successful examples of a cooperative federalism. Under 
the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, when state pollution plans do 
not live up to federal standards, the federal government puts its own 
regulations in place.84 If a state fails to set up a health care exchange 
under the Affordable Care Act, the federal government fills the void 
with its own exchange.85 If a state failed in its marijuana waiver 
obligations, however, the federal government would not substitute its 
own regulatory scheme. Instead, state failure would mean reverting to 
an essentially unenforceable federal prohibition. To be sure, if the 
waiver policy uniformly resulted in state compliance, the federal 
government’s remedy for failure would be a nonissue. But, in the 
event that a state did fall short, this would be a serious problem.   
81. Id. 
82. Chemerinsky et al., supra note 19, at 120–21 (2015). 
83. Cf. Kleiman, supra note 79, at 7 (observing that “[t]he choice of out-
come measures would be especially tricky” in any waiver system). 
84. See Chemerinsky et al., supra note 19, at 117–18 (describing the Clean 
Air and Clear Water Acts as examples of cooperative federalism). 
85. Id. at 118 (discussing the cooperative federalism elements of the Afford-
able Care Act). 
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Despite these challenges, some form of opt-out policy would create 
a level of certainty that would not be possible through the use of 
spending restrictions or affirmative defenses. It would eliminate the 
problem of trying to reconcile federal prohibition laws with state 
legalization while giving the federal government at least some measure 
of control over state marijuana reforms.86 Perhaps most important, a 
waiver program would give state marijuana operators certainty that 
they would not face federal prosecution for conduct they engaged in 
while the waiver was in effect. State marijuana operators would not 
have to fear future prosecution for present state-compliant conduct 
(as in the case of appropriations provisos) or that a minor violation of 
state law could lead to a lengthy federal prison sentence (as in the 
case of an affirmative defense based on compliance with state law).  
D. Federal Marijuana Regulation 
Last but not least, Congress could rethink federal marijuana pro-
hibition and enact its own set of marijuana regulations. If the goal is 
to eliminate the conflict between state and federal law entirely, 
removing marijuana from the Controlled Substances Act would be the 
most straightforward solution. This type of approach could include 
significant federal regulation of the legal marijuana market or not 
much regulation at all. Similarly, Congress could conceivably decide 
to leave federal prohibition in place in states that want it and directly 
regulate marijuana in states that have legalized. Or it could get rid of 
federal marijuana prohibition altogether, leaving states that want to 
ban the drug to do so on their own.  
The only comprehensive proposal of this sort has come from 
Congressman Jared Polis with his Ending Federal Marijuana Prohi-
bition Act.87 Polis’s bill would enact a range of changes to federal 
marijuana laws, chief among them being exempting marijuana from 
the Controlled Substances Act and then transferring enforcement 
authority over marijuana from the DEA to a newly renamed Bureau 
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Marijuana, Firearms, and Explosives.88 Polis’s 
bill would also add marijuana to two key federal alcohol statutes, the 
 
86. Kleiman, supra note 79, at 8 (“When states exercise their constitutional 
prerogative to replace their own prohibitions with systems of regulation 
and taxation (clearly preferable, in terms of the purposes of the CSA 
and the international treaties, to the outright repeal of all cannabis laws 
which is the states’ undoubted right), then the federal government 
would be well advised to cooperate with the inevitable and attempt to 
manage, rather than trying to squelch, the resulting somewhat paradox-
ical situation of state-licensed and state-taxed violations of federal 
law.”). 
87. H.R. 499, 113th Cong. § 101 (1st Sess. 2013).  
88. Id.  
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Wilson Act and the Webb-Kenyon Act.89 Though the federal 
government would issue permits for people who wanted to operate 
marijuana businesses under Polis’s proposal, there would be a 
relatively open process for obtaining them.90 This would leave most of 
the details of licensing and regulating marijuana businesses entirely 
with the states.  
This brief overview (which leaves out many elements of Polis’s 
bill) highlights the range of issues that any proposal for federal 
marijuana regulation would need to consider. Federal marijuana 
regulation could look a lot like alcohol regulation, as in Polis’s bill, or 
it could be much more restrictive or (less likely) more open. As 
discussed below, the federal government could use its regulations to 
try to limit the size of marijuana businesses to combat commercial-
ization or to very strictly police sales to minors itself.91 For purposes 
of putting state and federal marijuana laws on the same page, 
however, most of these details are unlikely to matter much. Even a 
relatively strict federal regulatory regime is likely to most effectively 
resolve the conflict between state marijuana reforms and federal law. 
This is because, regardless of the details, replacing federal prohibition 
with regulation would leave states free to decide to legalize marijuana 
without having to obtain a federal waiver or leaving state-legal 
marijuana businesses at risk of federal prosecution. In this sort of 
system, state legalization laws would not have to operate with federal 
prohibition lurking in the background. 
 
89. Id. § 202. 
90. Id. § 302 (describing the permit process). 
91. I leave to the side the very difficult question of how medical marijuana 
laws should be treated in a federal regulatory scheme. This issue pre-
sents its own challenges because medicines are regulated under the 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act—not just the Controlled Substances Act. 
Legalizing the drug for recreational purposes at the federal level would 
not necessarily answer how medical-only state laws should be addressed. 
Likewise, even if marijuana is legal for recreation, the government may 
want to specifically regulate the marketing of marijuana as a medicine. 
This might mean special restrictions or regulations on its sale as a 
medicine. Or it could mean letting some patients who use marijuana as 
a medicine receive insurance coverage. All of these are likely to be 
particularly thorny questions at both the state and federal level going 
forward since there is not a particularly good precedent for regulating a 
drug that is legally accepted for both medicine and recreation. See, e.g., 
Kimani Paul-Emile, Making Sense of Drug Regulation: A Theory of Law 
for Drug Control Policy, 19 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 691 (2010) 
(discussing the regulatory dissonance between drugs that are criminal-
ized entirely, accepted as medicines but not for recreation, and accepted 
as medicines and for recreation). 
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III. Advertising, Commercialization, and 
Federal Marijuana Reform 
While replacing federal marijuana prohibition with regulation 
might be the most effective way to bring federal law into line with 
state reforms, many observers believe this type of fundamental change 
to federal marijuana law is not politically viable as compared to other 
options.92 Nor is resolving the conflict between state and federal 
marijuana law the only goal policymakers should consider when 
thinking about federal marijuana law. Lawmakers and advocates who 
are opposed to or have mixed feelings about marijuana legalization 
are most obviously going to be concerned with more than just how to 
get out of the way of states that want to legalize the drug. At first 
glance, people in this camp might seem likely to most strenuously 
object to sweeping changes to federal marijuana laws. Between federal 
prohibition and regulation, an affirmative defense seems like an 
obvious compromise. But would a narrow approach to federal reform 
actually be in the best interest of marijuana prohibitionists and 
legalization agnostics? 
To date, proposals in the appropriations and affirmative defense 
categories have enjoyed the most political momentum. This may have 
to do with the fact that a spending proviso or a limited affirmative 
defense to federal prosecution would do the least damage to federal 
marijuana laws. In both scenarios, Congress could leave the Con-
trolled Substances Act and marijuana’s Schedule I status unchanged 
by adopting limited exceptions. From a drafting perspective, these 
would be relatively simple changes. And from a political perspective, 
they might hold some appeal for tentative legislators—they give some 
measure of protection to state marijuana reforms without necessarily 
endorsing the idea of legalization. For similar reasons, most observers 
also view a waiver or opt-out program as more politically promising 
than a proposal like Polis’s. As Mark Kleiman put it, “[g]ranting the 
Attorney General the authority to issue conditional and revocable (or 
renewable) waivers would constitute a far less drastic devolution of 
power to the states than amending the CSA to give unconditional 
deference to state marijuana-legalization legislation.”93 
In comparison to state waivers, affirmative defenses, and approp-
riations provisos, a proposal like Polis’s would represent the biggest 
break from federal marijuana prohibition. Granting waivers would 
allow for a logistically easy return to nationwide federal marijuana 
prohibition. By contrast, replacing federal prohibition with a regula-
 
92. E.g., Chemerinsky et al., supra note 19, at 114 (“Congress does not yet 
appear inclined to completely end or even to significantly curtail federal 
prohibition of marijuana.”). 
93. Kleiman, supra note 79, at 6.  
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tory system would incorporate the idea of state marijuana legalization 
into federal law in a way that would make it hard to turn back. In 
this sense, federal marijuana regulation would be a concession to the 
idea that existing state-level medical and recreational marijuana laws 
are not going anywhere and that state marijuana legalization is a 
legitimate policy option. It is understandable that many prohibition-
ists might not yet be ready to make this sort of allowance, especially 
when most elected officials continue to oppose marijuana legaliza-
tion.94 But holding onto the hope that political winds will shift—that 
instead of continuing to pass reforms, states will soon begin repealing 
existing medical and recreational marijuana laws—is not cost free. If 
legalization opponents do not constructively engage in the dialogue 
about how to fix federal marijuana laws, they risk ending up on the 
sidelines. If legalization opponents were to accept that changing fed-
eral law to account for state reforms is inevitable, however, they 
might find that more comprehensive reform could be in their interest 
as well. Thinking about what drives opposition to marijuana legaliz-
ation shows why this might be so. 
While legalization skeptics have cited a range of concerns, perhaps 
chief among them is the specter of a large-scale commercial marijuana 
industry.95 Leading marijuana legalization opponent Kevin Sabet, for 
example, argues that legalization would result in a large commercial 
marijuana industry that would invest heavily in promoting and adver-
tising marijuana.96 Sabet envisions a world in which “Big Marijuana” 
is dedicated to “creating addicts” and “targeting the young.”97 To be 
sure, legalization opponents worry about more than just the commer-
cialization of marijuana. Legalization in any form would reduce prices 
and increase youth access.98 But commercialization has emerged as the 
leading argument against legalization. As former Secretary of Health 
Education and Welfare Joseph A. Califano Jr. put it, “not only would 
legalized drugs be more openly available . . . but of even greater 
damage to our children would be the commercial reality that Madison  
94. See Wing, supra note 56 (“Out of 50 governors and 100 U.S. Senators 
only one has announced support for full legalization of marijuana.”).  
95. See, e.g., Alex Kreit, The Federal Response to State Marijuana 
Legalization: Room for Compromise?, 91 Or. L. Rev. 1029, 1031–32 
(2013) (discussing the argument that legalization marijuana would result 
in a large commercial marijuana industry). 
96. Kevin A. Sabet, A New Direction? Yes. Legalization? No. Drawing on 
Evidence to Determine Where to Go in Drug Policy, 91 Or. L. Rev. 
1153, 1173–74 (2013).  
97. Kevin A. Sabet, Op-Ed., Marijuana Is Now Big Business, N.Y. Times: 
Room for Debate (Nov. 10, 2014, 1:45 PM), http://www.nytimes.com 
/roomfordebate/2014/06/05/did-colorado-go-too-far-with-pot/marijuana 
-is-now-big-business.  
98. Sabet, supra note 96, at 1156–57. 
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Avenue marketers would be free to glamorize substances like mari-
juana.”99 No doubt, legalization opponents would prefer to return to 
nationwide marijuana prohibition. But if, as I argue above,100 that is 
not a realistic option, federal regulations aimed at limiting commer-
cialization to the extent possible might be their second-best altern-
ative.  
Though perhaps counterintuitive, the options for reforming federal 
marijuana law that seem to be the most prohibition friendly (spend-
ing provisos and affirmative defenses) are actually likely to give the 
federal government less control over marijuana regulation than would 
a more dramatic move. Preventing the federal government from 
spending money to prosecute people who comply with state marijuana 
laws or granting an affirmative defense based on state compliance 
would effectively cede the details of legalization entirely to the states. 
Although anyone who ran afoul of state law would risk tough federal 
criminal penalties, states would have complete control over how much 
(or how little) to regulate the marijuana market. A state like Cali-
fornia, where medical marijuana dispensaries are legal but entirely 
unregulated at the state level,101 would enjoy as much freedom as a 
state with a finely tuned regulatory regime.  
By comparison, although a waiver policy would give state 
legalization laws more legitimacy than an appropriations restriction or 
affirmative defense law, it would also give the federal government 
much more control over shaping state law. The federal government 
could demand state regulations meet certain standards in order to re-
ceive a waiver and then make renewals contingent upon satisfactory 
state-level enforcement. As a result, legalization skeptics would almost 
certainly find more success in furthering some of their goals through a 
waiver program than they would if Congress were to adopt yearly 
hands-off appropriations riders or add a state-law-compliance-based 
affirmative defense to the federal code.  
Federal regulation of the marijuana industry would allow for even 
more federal control. The federal government could retain federal pro-
hibition in states that want it, while simultaneously granting federal 
manufacturing and retail licenses in legalization states. Federal licen-
sure would give the federal government a number of possible methods 
for containing marijuana commercialization. It could limit federal 
retailers to a single license at a single location so that there is no 
possibility of a marijuana version of “BevMo.”  It could strictly limit 
 
99. Joseph A. Califano Jr., High Society 128 (2007).  
100. See supra Part I.  
101. See, e.g., Michael Vitiello, Why the Initiative Process Is the Wrong Way 
to Go: Lessons We Should Have Learned from Proposition 215, 
43 McGeorge L. Rev. 63, 69–70 (2012) (discussing the lack of state 
medical marijuana regulations in California). 
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the amount of marijuana each licensee could produce annually, in 
effect resulting in a marijuana market made up exclusively of craft 
beer–sized manufacturers.102 On this point, it is worth noting that the 
CSA already has a quota system for Schedule I and II substances in 
place.103 The existing quota structure is designed to limit drug 
production to an amount commensurate with the “medical, scientific, 
research, and industrial needs of the United States.”104 But quotas 
could also be used to limit the size of commercial entities that sell 
marijuana. And, in contrast to a waiver regime, directly regulating 
the market would give the federal government enforcement power 
over licensees. In sum, if “Big Marijuana” is one’s biggest concern 
about state marijuana legalization and if state legalization cannot be 
stopped, then federal regulations that would strictly limit the size of 
commercial marijuana enterprises might hold a lot of appeal. 
While federal regulation or a state waiver policy would give the 
federal government much more control over state legalization schemes 
than the current unenforceable federal prohibition or a modest affirm-
ative defense statute, advertising is likely to remain a sticking point 
for marijuana legalization opponents.105 Federal marijuana prohibition 
may not be able to block state legalization laws, effectively ceding all 
regulatory decisions to states that decide to legalize. Federal 
prohibition does, however, allow for a complete ban on marijuana 
advertising because there is no First Amendment right to advertise 
the sale of an illegal good. Indeed, federal law actually makes it a 
crime to advertise marijuana or any other Schedule I drug.106 To date, 
the federal government has not targeted marijuana advertising in its 
enforcement efforts in legalization states.107 But so long as marijuana 
 
102. Mark Kleiman described the potential for state quotas to limit the size 
of marijuana business in a white paper advising Washington State on its 
state marijuana regulations. See Mark A.R. Kleiman, Alternative 
Bases for Limiting Cannabis Production 8 (2013).  
103. 21 U.S.C. § 826(a) (2012) (requiring the Attorney General to “determine 
the total quantity and establish production quotas for each basic class of 
controlled substance in schedules I and II . . . to be manufactured each 
calendar year to provide for the estimated medical, scientific, research, 
and industrial needs of the United States”).  
104. Id.  
105. Sabet, supra note 96, at 1173 (“In the United States, a country obsessed 
with commercialization in the name of the First Amendment, legaliza-
tion is sure to be an even riskier proposition.”). 
106. 21 U.S.C. § 843(c) (2012).  
107. Cf. Benjamin B. Wagner & Jared C. Dolan, Medical Marijuana and 
Federal Narcotics Enforcement in the Eastern District of California, 43 
McGeorge L. Rev. 109, 110 (2012) (“Businesses now openly sell 
marijuana and advertise their services in the newspaper, on the radio 
and on television [in California].”). 
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remains illegal federally, the DOJ could conceivably amend its prose-
cutorial guidance to advise prosecutors to target marijuana adver-
tising while otherwise permitting state-legal marijuana businesses. 
Moreover, keeping marijuana illegal at the federal level strengthens 
the First Amendment case for more rigorously enforced state-level 
advertising bans where the drug has been legalized,108 though the issue 
has not yet been tested in court.109  
If federal law were to formally recognize state legalization via 
waivers or affirmative regulation, advertising bans would be on very 
shaky ground. The framework for addressing commercial advertising 
restrictions dates back to the Supreme Court’s 1980 Central Hudson 
decision.110 Under Central Hudson, the government can ban adver-
tising that is deceptive or that is “related to illegal activity.”111 Non-
misleading advertisements for legal goods can only be prohibited if the 
government is able to (1) claim a substantial interest in restricting 
the speech, (2) demonstrate that its restriction directly and materially 
advances its interest, and (3) show that the restriction is narrowly 
tailored to that interest.112 Though early decisions applying Central 
Hudson indicated that restrictions on vice advertisements—for gam-
bling, alcohol, and so on—might be permitted, the Court has since 
“rejected the idea that the Central Hudson analysis is more lenient for 
government regulation of vice product advertising.”113 
Government restrictions on vice advertisements under Central 
Hudson typically fail the requirements that the restriction would 
 
108. Joseph M. Cabosky, The Advertising Regulation “Green Zone,” 5 
Charlotte L. Rev. 1, 33 (2014) (observing that the federal prohi-
bition on marijuana might provide a basis for upholding Denver’s ban 
on outdoor marijuana advertising).  
109. A group of publishers sued Colorado over its advertising ban but lacked 
standing to pursue the claim because there was no indication retail 
marijuana outlets had sought to buy advertising from them.  
Trans-High Corp. v. Colo., No. 14-cv-00370—MSK, 2014 WL 585367 
(D. Colo. Feb. 14, 2014) (denying a motion for preliminary injunction 
but granting leave to file an amended complaint because “[t]here is no 
allegation that any advertiser has been discouraged from seeking to 
place advertisements with either of the Plaintiffs. Thus, as currently 
drafted, the Complaint does not contain a colorable showing sufficient 
for the Plaintiffs to pursue the rights of advertisers.”).  
110. Cen. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557 (1980). 
111. Id. at 563–64. 
112. Educ. Media Co. at Va. Tech, Inc. v. Insley, 731 F.3d 291, 298 (4th Cir. 
2013) (describing the Central Hudson test). 
113. Michael Hoefges, Protecting Tobacco Advertising Under the Commercial 
Speech Doctrine: The Constitutional Impact of Lorillard Tobacco Co., 8 
Comm. L. & Pol’y 267, 283 (2003). 
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actually advance the government’s interest and that there aren’t 
narrower, non–speech restrictive alternatives. This can be true even 
where advertisements appear to target an audience that cannot legally 
buy the product being advertised. A recent Fourth Circuit decision 
overturning a Virginia ban on advertising alcohol in college student 
newspapers is instructive. The ads could not be restricted on the 
theory that they involve illegal activity because “alcohol advertise-
ments—even those that reach a partially underage audience—concern 
the lawful activity of alcohol consumption.”114 Though the court 
granted that the government has a substantial interest in combatting 
underage drinking, it concluded that the ban was not narrowly 
tailored because “roughly 60% of the Collegiate Times’s readership is 
age 21 or older and the Cavalier Daily reaches approximately 10,000 
students, nearly 64% of whom are age 21 or older.”115 Central Hudson 
leaves room for some limits on advertisements on legal goods, of 
course. A ban on alcohol advertisements in high school newspapers 
would likely withstand a First Amendment challenge.116 But mari-
juana prohibitionists’ concerns that legalization might mean having to 
allow a great deal of marijuana advertising are not misplaced. 
Of course, there might be creative ways to directly limit some 
marijuana advertising in the absence of federal prohibition. The fed-
eral government could attempt to devise a legal hook for advertising 
limits by enacting a prohibition that it does not intend to enforce—for 
example, criminalizing the use of marijuana while licensing its 
manufacture and sale and allowing its possession. In theory, this may 
allow for bans on marijuana advertising that promoted use. Or if the 
federal government legalized only the intrastate sale of marijuana, it 
could try banning advertisements that crossed state lines. Unless the 
Supreme Court were to reassess its view of the commercial speech 
doctrine, however, it may be impossible to put any significant restrict-
 
114. Educ. Media Co. at Va. Tech, Inc., 731 F.3d at 299. 
115. Id. at 301. 
116. Though it is worth noting that, in light of a recent Second Circuit case 
holding that a prosecution for promoting off-label uses of prescription 
drugs violates the First Amendment, even long-standing commercial 
speech regulations are on potentially shaky ground. United States v. 
Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012). See also, e.g., Constance E. 
Bagley et al., Snake Oil Salesmen or Purveyors of Knowledge: Off-Label 
Promotions and the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 23 Cornell J. L. & 
Pub. Pol’y 337, 339 (2013) (“The Second Circuit’s reasoning has the 
potential to undermine the constitutionality of numerous areas of federal 
regulation, including regulation of the offer and sale of securities under 
the Securities Act of 1933; the solicitation of shareholder proxies and the 
periodic reporting under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; 
mandatory labels on food, tobacco, and pesticides; and a wide range of 
privacy protections.”). 
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ions on marijuana advertising in the absence of federal marijuana 
prohibition. 
For this reason, First Amendment concerns may lead prohibition-
ists to view appropriations restrictions as the most acceptable method 
for reconciling federal and state marijuana laws. Forbidding the 
executive to spend money interfering with state marijuana reforms 
would leave federal marijuana prohibition untouched, thereby almost 
certainly permitting bans on advertising. An affirmative defense based 
on compliance with state marijuana laws or a state waiver policy 
might also leave room for advertising bans, though this is less certain. 
If the federal government continued to ban marijuana sales with an 
affirmative defense, it is hard to predict whether the activity would 
still be considered illegal under Central Hudson. Even a federal waiver 
system might allow for an argument for the constitutionality of 
advertising bans. Imagine a law that let states opt out of most federal 
marijuana laws but not the federal law forbidding advertisements. 
The federal government could also make its waivers contingent on a 
state-level advertising ban. It is possible that this sort of scheme 
would be enough to keep marijuana sales in the “illegal activity” 
category for First Amendment purposes. 
Those concerned by the idea of marijuana advertising should not 
be too quick to discount federal marijuana regulation, however. 
Though federal marijuana regulations would make it difficult to 
directly limit marijuana advertising to adults, they might still give 
prohibitionists the most effective tools for limiting the sort of 
commercialization that is likely to result in extensive advertising.117 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has cited the availability of “non-speech 
related” policies similar to the quota options discussed above when 
striking down advertising restrictions.118 In finding a Food and Drug 
Administration ban on advertising compounded drugs unconstitu-
tional, for example, the Court observed that the federal government 
could limit the incentive to advertise by “capping the amount of any 
particular compounded drug . . . that a pharmacist or pharmacy may 
make or sell in a given period of time.”119  
While marijuana legalization opponents might prefer not to think 
about how to change marijuana laws, they may soon be forced to. 
What sort of federal accommodation of state law might best combat 
marijuana commercialization: a strict federal regulatory scheme or a 
 
117. Jonathan P. Caulkins et al., Marijuana Legalization: What 
Everyone Needs to Know 155 (2012) (“The extent of advertising 
would depend in part on whether the legal marijuana industry is 
dominated by a few large corporations with national advertising  
budgets.”).  
118. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 372 (2002). 
119. Id.  
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system that would provide for the best chance of constitutionally 
banning marijuana advertising but leave all other details of marijuana 
regulation to the states? This is the sort of question prohibitionists 
should be considering sooner rather than later.  
Conclusion 
With most politicians still wary of marijuana reforms, Congress is 
unlikely to reconsider federal marijuana prohibition this year or the 
next. But while a change in federal marijuana law may not be immi-
nent, it is almost certainly inevitable. Almost half of the states allow 
for the medical use of marijuana, and four states have passed laws to 
legalize the drug entirely. Due to resource constraints, the federal 
government has proven itself unable to effectively block these state 
laws by enforcing its own prohibition. As a result, in states that have 
legalized the drug, federal marijuana prohibition continues in name 
only. Unless states suddenly reverse course and begin recriminalizing 
marijuana or the Supreme Court finds that state legalization laws are 
preempted by the Controlled Substances Act—both exceedingly 
unlikely events—federal marijuana prohibition’s days are numbered.  
This Article compares different avenues for reforming federal mari-
juana laws, with the goal of highlighting some of the considerations 
that might drive the debate in the coming years.  
To date, efforts to reconcile federal marijuana law with state 
reforms have focused mostly on relatively narrow proposals, like 
forbidding the DOJ from spending money to interfere with state 
marijuana laws or establishing a limited affirmative defense to federal 
marijuana prosecutions based on compliance with state law. At first 
glance, these proposals might seem most likely to be palatable to 
legalization opponents since they would do the least cosmetic damage 
to existing law. But more far-reaching reforms, like a state waiver sys-
tem or federal marijuana regulation, could actually give the federal 
government more control in addressing prohibitionists’ primary con-
cern: marijuana commercialization. Meanwhile, legalization supporters 
will be less likely to settle for half-measures when it comes to federal 
marijuana reform as their political strength continues to rise.   
While legalization opponents may understandably be hesitant to 
concede ground on scaling back federal prohibition, if they wait too 
long, they may find themselves on the sidelines, with the content of 
federal marijuana reforms left almost entirely in the hands of legaliz-
ation proponents, much like the state legalization laws themselves. 
 
